



HEADQUARTERS
International Security Assistance Force
DCOS COMM, TRADCOMM
APO, AE 09356
Kabul, Afghanistan



STIO / TRADCOMM
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CNA Handbook Review

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

We have received positive feedback overall from those who reviewed the handbook. It is replete with exceedingly useful information, but not suited for our target audience and principal purpose—Insider Threat Mitigation. The statement-of-work, as reflected in the handbook, sought a primer or guide, with a specific intended audience--deployed troops; it has missed the mark. The handbook's content and form should be structured to facilitate engagement and outreach, as a method for mitigating insider threat--the principal objective--among many. Further, the handbook should be broken-down into separate compendiums to enhance learning at all levels. The handbook is Kabul centric and is not inclusive of all sects / ethnic compositions of Afghanistan. It also overlooks the contribution of non-Arab Muslims in Afghanistan.

Following are comments and recommendations for improving the handbook to meet the intended purpose:

Structure and content: The statement-of-work, as reflected in the handbook, sought a primer or guide, with a specific intended audience--deployed troops; it has missed the mark. The handbook's content and form should be structured to facilitate engagement and outreach, as a method for mitigating insider threat--the principal objective--among many. Further, the handbook should be broken-down into separate compendiums to enhance learning at all levels. Recommend the nine research goals / objectives be used to produce a 9-book package of primers--analogous to "cliff notes" or packaged compendiums like the children's "Goosebumps" series or USMC Manuals circa 1990's. Each of the objectives could be the title of a corresponding book: (1) Role of Religion in War..... (2) Influence in Daily Life..... etc., concluding with (9) Mitigating Insider threat. Like the aforementioned series, each succeeding book would build on the previous. Each book should contain as many charts, graphs, lists, pictures as possible to facilitate learning / retention at the lowest levels--squad leader and sergeants' time and be no more than 12-15 pages. Further, all products should contain associated vignettes (annex A) with practical applications and best practices (annex B), for use at every conceivable level of training.

Diversity of sects: The handbook reflects a particular Sunni understanding of the legitimacy of the state and the ruler, but fails to represent the fact that Shi'a have a very different understanding. While it is true that the majority of Afghans are Sunni, the authors should either explain the difference between the Sunni versus the Shia understanding of political legitimacy or clearly label what is presented as a Sunni perspective.

Methodology: The methodology is not as comprehensive as it should / could be, as the survey did not extend to western Afghanistan, Shia dominated Bamian, or important southeastern provinces like Ghazni, Zabol, Oruzgan, Paktika or Wardak.

Credentials: It is inevitable that some will question some of the information in the handbook, the credentials of the author and his qualifications to write such a work. Recommend the handbook include a preface wherein credentials are delineated. It should include the author's credentials in area studies, Islamic theology, ethics and culture, as well as the credentials (PhDs / known scholars) of those who reviewed the handbook.

COIN Reference: The section "Guiding principles and best business practices for engaging religious leaders in the field" lists one of these practices as "Align engagement with civil society roles and COIN priorities." Under that it states that "IC engagement activities should leverage the civil society functions performed by religious leaders that further counterinsurgency priorities." It is one thing to say that military activities should further COIN objectives, but quite another to say that the IC writ large should do so. Many IC actors remain skeptical about COIN; some are hostile towards it; and most would be uncomfortable with the perception that they are partnered with military forces.

Non-Arab Muslims: Much is made of the fact that several Islamic nations have sent military forces to Afghanistan. The paper lumps them into the category of "Arabs," noting the mixed history of Arab involvement in religious engagement in Afghanistan. This effectively ignores the many non-Arab Muslim states that engage here, most notably Turkey, and does not adequately address the opportunities that states like that afford the effort.

The chart below encapsulates the comments above and includes recommendations for improving the handbook—making it intuitive and user friendly:

Action Item	Description	Mitigation
Structure and content	Not suited for our target audience and principal purpose—Insider Threat Mitigation	Recommend the nine research goals / objectives be used to produce a 9-book package of primers Each book should contain as many charts, graphs, lists, pictures as possible to facilitate learning / retention at the lowest levels--squad leader and sergeants' time and be no more than 12-15 pages. Further, book should contain associated vignettes (Annex-A) with practical applications and best practices (Annex-B).
Diversity	Lack of reference to Afghan Shia	Address the Shia's interpretation of Islam, and specifically, Afghan Shia. Also address Shias' (Hazara) status in Afghan society.
Methodology	Extend survey data pool	Ensure surveys are inclusive of all Afghanistan. ISAF / IC is conducting engagements and operations country-wide.
Credentials	Author's credentials/experience could be questioned	Identify a credible and competent organization with recognized credentials to read the CNA Handbook and provide feedback. Include the latter in the Handbook's preface.
COIN Reference	Reference to COIN as sole guiding principal in executing COMISAF's Lines of Operations	Review COIN references IOT ensure they are not the exclusive guiding principles of IC activities in Afghanistan. The Handbook ought to be writing within COMISAF's Enduring Priorities.
Non-Arab Muslims	Lack of reference to non-Arab Muslims as major players	Encompass non-Arab Muslims' involvement and influence over Afghanistan's society and governance. Turkey is ISAF's largest contributor of Muslim service members.

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Insider Threat Vignette #1 Afghanistan Insider Threat

Instructor Note: *Learning Points should be drawn out via questions while discussing the incident vignettes in small group/unit training. Read the location and background information to the students before you start the vignette discussions. Do not read the incident summary to the students.*

Vignette #1 (Inside an Afghan Government Ministry)

Incident Summary: On 25 February 2012, two US service members were killed by a member of the ANSF inside the secure Ministry of Interior Headquarters building in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Location and Background: Afghan Government Ministry headquarters building, Kabul Province. Two US service members, who are both well liked by interpreters, Afghan partners, and local national employees, are working on the compound. They have their own office which has a door with a cipher lock that only US personnel know the combination to enter.

Details: Earlier in the year, Qurans were burned at consolidated burn pit on a coalition Airbase and it turns into headline news and riots ensue throughout Afghanistan and other Muslim countries. Soon after this event, one of the US service members had a conversation with several Afghans at the Ministry regarding the burning of the Qurans. This conversation included an ANSF co-worker. The Soldier then talked to his roommate about the discussion and his roommate warned him that he should be careful with sensitive conversations.

The next day, the ANSF co-worker was seen walking into the MOI building where the two US service members worked. The ANSF member had his assigned 9mm pistol with him when he entered the building. As he entered the building, he had his head down and did not acknowledge any of the local nationals outside the building. This ANSF member normally walked with his head down; however, this day, several witnesses noticed him uncharacteristically staring down a US service member for no apparent reason.

Immediately after entering the Ministry building, the ANSF Subject entered the office of the US service member who discussed the Quran burning the day before and murdered him and the other US service member who was in the office. The ANSF Subject then walked out of the building and is still at large.

Learning Point 1: Cultural sensitivity. *Global current events may have a direct impact on your ANSF partners. You need to constantly assess how global current events impact the force protection level. Furthermore, culturally sensitive issues such*

as this should be avoided when conversing with Afghan partners and locals, especially if they may be perceived as insulting to our ANSF partners if taken out of context.

Learning Point 2: Atmospherics. *After the incident occurred, several individuals, both US and Afghan, said that they noticed a change in the ANSF Subjects demeanor before the incident occurred. If they had reported the change or inquired with the ANSF Subject if he was feeling all right, they may have been able to defuse the situation before it became deadly.*

Learning Point 3: Complacency. *There were additional force protection measures that could have been utilized which may have changed the outcome of this incident. The door was apparently left open and the ANSF Subject was able to walk in unimpeded.*

What ifs:

- What if there had been a “guardian angel” either inside or just outside of where the two US service members worked?
- What if the door had been locked?
- What if someone would have talked to the ANSF member about his demeanor?
- What if the U.S. Service member would have refrained from discussing a highly sensitive cultural issue with the locals during this time of increased tension?

**Insider Threat Vignette #2
Afghanistan Insider Threat**

Instructor Note: *Learning Points should be drawn out via questions while discussing the incident vignettes in small group/unit training. Read the location and background information to the students before you start the vignette discussions. Do not read the incident summary to the students.*

Vignette #2 (At a Combat Outpost with partnered coalition and ANSF units)

Incident Summary: On 01 March 2012, an ANA NCO and an Afghan interpreter engaged checkpoints and a mortar pit at a Combat Outpost with RPG and small arms. A combined Afghan-coalition suppressed the attack, causing them to flee.

Location and Background: Combat Outpost (COP), Northern Afghanistan. A combined Afghan-US unit had been working together for the last four months. One of the Afghan interpreters on the COP became familiar with some of the US soldiers. He spends time socializing with them and often brings them fruit from outside the COP. When he begins to ask probing questions about classified information, the soldiers distance themselves from him and notify their leadership. The interpreter is reprimanded, and then begins to act coldly to the US soldiers, spend less time with

them and more time with one of the ANA NCOs on the COP. The US unit has trained on active shooter drills within the past three months.

Details: During static security operations, an ANA NCO approached the COP entry control point (ECP) and had an argument with the ANA guard at the ECP. The argument was witnessed by the US soldier who was also guarding the ECP. The ANA soldier then approached the ECP and shot the ANA guard in the shoulder then engaged the US soldier by shooting him in the chest (he was wearing his full personal protective equipment and received only minor injuries). The ANA shooter then fled back into the compound in an attempt to blend back into the ANA. The active shooter procedures were initiated, but the shooter could not be located.

Shortly after the initial engagement, the ANA NCO and the interpreter went into a tower from within the compound and killed the US soldier in the tower and began shooting into the COP with small arms and RPGs. Most of the assailants' fires focused on the company command post and the mortar firing point. The combined unit began to engage the tower to suppress the assailants.

The two enemy combatants subsequently escaped out of the tower and moved away from the COP where they were followed by the aerostat camera and ultimately engaged and killed by close combat air support.

Learning Point 1: *Atmospherics.* *The Afghan civilian interpreter exhibited signs of colluding with the enemy by asking about sensitive information after having become unduly familiar with the US soldiers. While they did the right thing by notifying their leadership, the interpreter should have been isolated and further investigated prior to being allowed back inside the COP.*

Learning Point 2: *Active Shooter Training.* *Active shooter training was crucial to quickly responding to the incident. Though the assailant could not be quickly located, the unit quickly adopted an alerted state and was able to quickly respond to the assailants when the follow-on attack occurred. Units should not wait for or plan to rely on QRF or air support for insider threat incidents.*

What ifs:

- What if the interpreter had been investigated further for links to the insurgency?
- What if the unit had NOT conducted Active Shooter Training? What could have gone wrong?

What if the assailants had been detained instead of killed?

**Insider Threat Vignette #3
Afghanistan Insider Threat**

Instructor Note: Learning Points should be drawn out via questions while discussing the incident vignettes in small group/unit training. Read the location and background

information to the students before you start the vignette discussions. Do not read the incident summary to the students.

Vignette #3 (The Insider Attack After a Shura)

Incident Summary: On 10 August 2012, three US Marines were killed by an Afghan Local Policeman (ALP) inside a base Tactical Operations Center (TOC) after a shura.

Location and Background: A Village Security Platform (VSP), near Sangin. Atmospherics around the base indicated a good working relationship between the ALP and the VSP personnel. There had been no disagreements between the groups. The US Marine leadership had been highly regarded by the locals, and always used a very welcoming, inclusive approach.

Details: After the end of an evening shura, a US Marine noticed an Afghan dressed in an ALP uniform wandering around in the VSP compound. When questioned by the Marine, he said that he was trying to find an individual on the base who was unknown to the Marine. He was then escorted to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) in an attempt to find out who the alleged ALP member was or who he was looking for.

The other Marines in the TOC did not recognize the ALP member and directed the escorting Marine to remove the individual from the compound.

As the individual was being escorted to outside of the compound, the ALP member opened fire on the escorting Marine and then returned to the TOC where he engaged the other Marines. In the end, three US Marines were killed and one Marine was wounded. The shooter escaped.

One witness said that he remembered seeing the ALP member was wearing his weapon and a chest rig at the time.

Learning Point 1: *Complacency.* *Unescorted or unauthorized individuals inside a secure compound, should be respectfully but expeditiously escorted to a location where they can be controlled before finding out why they are there. Never let your guard down.*

Learning Point 2: *Atmospherics.* *While overall atmospherics were good, these will not represent reality if there is a motivated infiltrator. Other indicators may demonstrate the intent of a particular individual, such as an individual's confusion or the wearing of a loaded weapon in a secure location. If an unknown individual is found in the compound alone, there is a definite lack of security which must be dealt with immediately.*

Learning Point 3: *Pre-arranged meetings.* *KLEs and shuras require a heightened state of awareness for coalition forces. Special attention should be paid to those individuals who are not playing a key role in the meeting, but are on the sidelines of*

the meeting. All participants should always be accounted for during and after the meetings.

What if:

- What if the unknown individual was brought outside the compound quickly and respectfully instead of into the TOC?
- What if the Marine requested that the ALP member take his magazines out of his weapon?
- What if there was a guardian angel in the TOC?

**Insider Threat Vignette #4
Afghanistan Insider Threat**

Instructor Note: Learning Points should be drawn out via questions while discussing the incident vignettes in small group/unit training. Read the location and background information to the students before you start the vignette discussions. Do not read the incident summary to the students.

Vignette #4 (The District Chief of Police's Assistant)

Incident Summary: On 10 August, a seventeen year-old Afghan boy shoots four US Marines in a base gymnasium.

Location and Background: A District Chief of Police (DCoP) and the AUP in his charge are advised by a Police Advisory Team (PAT). The PAT lives and works at the District Police Headquarters (DPHQ) with their Afghan counterparts. Members of the team frequently exercised at an open-air gym located on the DPHQ grounds. On occasion AUP members exercise alongside Marines at that gym.

A new DCoP took charge of the DPHQ, and two days later his personal attendant arrived and began work. His work was commensurate with that of a personal assistant, cleaning up the DCoP's quarters and serving food and tea to the DCoP and his staff officers. He was biometrically enrolled lately but had no personal or police identification.

Details: Seven members of the PAT (six Marines and one Navy Corpsman) were exercising together at the open-air gym in the compound. No AUP were present at the time. At 20.30, without warning, the Afghan boy-assistant of the DCoP approached the entrance to the gym and began firing an AK-47 at the US troops. The boy fired several bursts of 4-5 shots, all targetting the US personel until he had killed two US Marines in the gym and two were shot while escaping. Two of the Marines and the corpsman escaped unharmed.

The three survivors stated that the attacker appeared quietly and they did not notice him until he began firing. Nearly all members exercising that evening had on headphones or ear buds and this was a relatively nightly workout routine in the makeshift open air weightlifting gymnasium. The three survivors had brought their pistols with them, but they had been unable to acquire them to respond to the shooter.

The shooter was isolated and detained by QRF. It is unclear where he found the AK-47.

Learning Point 1: *Situational Awareness.* *The shooter was not recognized by the US troops until he started firing because they had head phones or ear buds on. Perhaps if they were able to hear or see him before the attack commenced, they could have reached their weapons.*

Learning Point 2: *Force protection.* *The employment of a guardian angel was not a standard practice at the time. Additionally, the PAT should have insisted that the DCoP had properly vetted all of his personnel. New Afghan personnel should also be biometrically enrolled and issued an identification card or uniform, if applicable. There should be no exceptions to this, even if the individual is a 'friend' of the base commander.*

Additionally, personnel should vary their routines and avoid letting their guard down in non-secure locations.

Keep situational awareness and ensure all personnel know the proper procedures for allowing entry into a secure area.

What ifs:

- What if there was a guardian angel in the gym?
- What if there had been a battle buddy system and personnel had varied their routines?
- What if the individuals in the open-air gym went to the secure gym that existed on the US FOB?
- What if the individuals in the gym were NOT using their earphones or ear buds?

**Insider Threat Vignette #5
Afghanistan Insider Threat**

Vignette # 5 (Lured In and Isolated)

Incident Summary:

Vignette 5: Coalition Soldiers were conducting a mounted patrol from FOB Brooklyn to visit the Commander of the ANCOP located at CP 23. The ANCOP Commander

requested the meeting to help finalize his unit's training plan. The Team had been in country for 8 months and conducted pre and post mobilization training on React to an Active Shooter. Although, at the beginning of the deployment React to an Active Shooter was regularly a part of their Team rehearsals, over time, they rehearsed the task less often. Part of the Team's internal standing operating procedure was to assign a Guardian Angel (GA) for every mission. The visit was within the normal scope of their duties as the Police Advisory Team (PAT) for the ANCOP elements in their Area of Operation (AO). The PAT, consisting of 11 Soldiers, had been to this Camp on numerous occasions with no incident. The Team's recent visits to the ANCOP identified several ANCOP members had recently returned from Absent Without Leave (AWOL) status. The ANCOP Commander informed the Team Leader that several of his AWOL members were believed to have recently returned from areas where insurgents have strong influence. Additionally, he had discovered several pro-Taliban audio cassettes during recent Health and Welfare inspections of his unit. Upon arrival, the Team was greeted by one member of the ANCOP, who stated both gates to the Camp were broken and the Team would have to enter by foot. On previous occasions, there were usually three ANCOP members at the entrance point. On this visit, the Team only saw one member. The Team Leader decided to split his Team up-- leaving five Soldiers outside the camp with the vehicles and entering the Camp with a Team consisting of six Soldiers. The ANCOP member led the Team to a room to wait for the ANCOP Commander. At first, the Team Leader thought it was strange the ANCOP Commander was not there to meet them in the office. On every previous engagement, he was always in the office to welcome them to the post. After waiting about 15 minutes, the Team Leader asked the ANCOP member for an update on the Commander's arrival and was told the Commander would be with them shortly. The Team Leader could see the rest of the ANCOP members mounting their vehicles to leave the Camp. After an additional 10 minutes passed, the Commander still had not arrived. At this time, the Team Leader could see the vehicles staged on the road outside the Camp. The Team's Interpreter stated to the Team Leader that he felt something was wrong. The Team Leader then decided that the team should leave immediately. In a rush to get out of the CP, the team got disorganized and their GA was not in position to observe his team. The ANCOP member opened the door to his sangar (small building) to allow the Team to leave the Camp. After the Team passed the ANCOP member, he ran back to a sangar to the northeast, picked up his weapon and engaged the team with small arms fire. By the time he engaged the Team, three of the six had already cleared the CP.

Learning Point 1: Soldiers need to be aware of changes to the operations of the Camps they visit. Also, strange situations or unusual should not be overlooked. If the patrol looked in the sangar adjacent to the entry point, they would have discovered one of the ANCOP guards cowering in the corner. Also, if the gates were inoperable, where were the ANCOP guards mounting their vehicles going?

Learning Point 2: Once you suspect the situation could result in actions taken against you or your teams, you must ensure you maintain your security. 360 degree security is a must in every tactical situation you are in. The team suspected something was wrong, but did not take proper security precautions while leaving the camp and did not properly practice their Guardian Angel employment.

Learning Point 3: The ANCOP Commander always made it a point to be in the office when the Team arrived to welcome them to the post. The shooter was described as a loner who was particularly devout in his religious beliefs. Also, his brother was killed during an Afghan Uniform Police intervention into what the suspect believed was a tribal conflict. The ANCOP Commander also relayed to the Team Commander his issues with AWOL Soldiers returning from areas where insurgents had strong influence and finding pro-Taliban audio cassettes in his units. How could the ANCOP's atmospherics help the Team Leader develop his situational awareness and improve his force protection posture and Insider Threat Awareness for the meeting? With those indicators, should the mission have been postponed or moved to the Team's base?

Questions to create discussion:

What is the likelihood of both gates being inoperable at the same time? Is that enough of an indicator that something is wrong?

Should you be concerned if there are fewer guards standing a post than usual?

Do you think it was an appropriate decision to split the forces? How would you then employ your Guardian Angels for the meeting?

Would you have rescheduled the meeting because of the issues with the gate and the change in force protection posture of the Camp?

Why do you think the Team Leader waited 10 minutes to make the decision to leave after seeing the ANCOP members mounting their vehicles?

What factors should you consider before leaving the office and heading out of the camp?

How was one ANCOP member able to effectively isolate 6 Soldiers for 25 minutes?

What action or precautions could have been taken to prevent this incident?

What mistakes did the unit make in its employment of its Guardian Angel or its preparation for react to active shooter?

Do you think the unit displayed any signs of complacency? If so, what can you do to prevent that in your unit?

**Insider Threat Vignette #6
Afghanistan Insider Threat**

Vignette # 6 ECP Operations

Incident Summary:

Vignette 6: Two Soldiers are conducting Entry Control Point (ECP) operations at the main gate of the FOB. The base was under heightened security measures because of several protests by Afghan locals outside the FOB. The local community was agitated over resent incidents involving desecration of the Koran by Coalition Forces. The local Imam has called for the killing of the Anglo-Saxon invaders because of their flagrant disregard of human life and disrespect of the teaching of Mohammad. At 1010hrs, two Afghan National Army (ANA) Ranger vehicles pulled up to the gate. An ANA Lieutenant dismounted his vehicle and opened fire on the Coalition Soldiers. The shooter was later killed when he tried to enter the FOB. Following the incident, an Interpreter spoke with the ANA Soldiers who stayed in the vehicle and they stated they had no idea why the incident happened. Further inquiries into the incident concluded that the motivation for the incident was a verbal altercation between the shooter and Coalition Forces when he was denied entry earlier at approximately 0810hrs that morning. The shooter was also a devout follower of the local Imam and attended his mosque daily.

Learning Point 1: Soldiers must be professional in their actions when dealing with Afghans. Elevated tones, profane language and aggressive arm gestures can be extremely offensive and even dishonor an Afghan. Some Afghans believe the loss of honor can only be regained by violent action against the perpetrator of the perceived offense. Use of Interpersonal Communication Skills should be used to defuse the situation. Respect for other cultures and knowledge of the norms and offenses is paramount when conducting operations with local nationals. If a situation develops into an argument, try to defuse and then, report the incident to chain of command. Give as much detail as you can about the incident, persons and vehicle description.

Learning Point 2: Do not assume by a person's rank that they will not harm you. Insider attacks are not only committed by lower ranking Soldiers. Several incidents have either been committed or orchestrated by NCOs, Officers and Commanders of Afghan National Security Forces. The shooter in this incident was a LT with 4 years of service in the ANA.

Learning Point 3: When manning an ECP, there should be someone providing security and overwatch (Guardian Angel Employment) for the Point/Contact Soldier at the gate. You should only send enough Soldiers to the vehicle to accomplish the mission while security is provided behind cover. Maximum efforts should be made to limit the exposure of Soldiers conducting ECP operations. ECP members should have established evacuation routes if the situation warrants in order to allow the security element to engage any hostile threats.

Questions to Create Discussion:

How do you defuse a verbal situation with a person whose language and culture you don't understand?

What are some effective techniques to provide security for the contact person at your entry control point?

What actions or precautions could have been taken to prevent this incident?

What steps can Local Military Leaders take to help improve the image of Coalition Forces in the AO?

What type of rehearsals can unit leaders conduct prior to the mission to help prepare Soldiers for Insider Threat Attacks/Incidents?

How can you employ the Guardian Angel concept into ECP operations?

How could the atmospherics of the local units help prevent this incident from happening?

Insider Threat Vignette #7 Afghanistan Insider Threat

Instructor Note: Learning Points should be drawn out via questions while discussing the incident vignettes in small group/unit training. Read the location and background information to the students before you start the vignette discussions. Do not read the incident summary to the students.

Vignette # 7 (ANA Shooter at US FOB)

Incident Summary: On 03 JUL 12, An ANA soldier walked into the U.S. side of OP Hashenkhel and opened fire with a M249. Coalition Forces (CF) returned fire and the shooter dropped the weapon and fled. Shooter was not located.

Location and Background:

Details:

Learning Point 1: Cultural sensitivity. Global current events may have a direct impact on your ANSF partners. You need to constantly assess how global current events impact the force protection level. Furthermore, culturally sensitive issues such as this should be avoided, especially if they may be perceived as insulting to our ANSF partners if taken out of context. Always remain sensitive to offenses to your Afghan hosts and where necessary, apologize for wrong doing that offended your

Afghan hosts and regularly speak to your counterparts to help to de-escalate any building tensions over perceived slights, offenses, inequities.

Learning Point 2: Atmospherics. *After the incident occurred, several individuals both US and Afghan said that they noticed a change in the ANSF Subject's demeanor before the incident occurred. If they would have reported the change or inquired with the ANSF Subject if he was doing all right, they may have been able to defuse the situation before it became deadly.*

Learning Point 3: Complacency. *There were additional force protection measures that could have been utilized which may have changed the outcome of this incident. The door was apparently left open and the ANSF Subject was able to walk in unimpeded.*

What ifs:

- What if there had been a "guardian angel" either inside or just outside of where the two US service members worked?
- What if the door had been locked?
- What if someone would have talked to the ANSF member about his demeanor?

**Insider Threat Vignette # 8
Afghanistan Insider Threat**

Instructor Note: *Learning Points should be drawn out via questions while covering the incident vignettes. Read the location and background information to the students before you start the vignette discussions. Do not read the incident summary to the students.*

Vignette # 8 (ANP shooter at Regional Training Center)

Incident Summary: On 22 JUL 12, one ANP Officer opened fire on U.S. Civilian Contractor mentors from the Border Management Task Force working in Herat Regional Training Center. Two Civilian Contractors were killed, one British Contractor WIA, later DOW, one U.S. contractor WIA and one Afghan civilian interpreter WIA. Shooter was killed.

Location and Background: On 22 JUL 12, U.S. Civilian contractors were working with their Afghan counterparts at Regional Training Center Tango when one ANP Officer opened fire on the civilian contractor mentors.

Details: Earlier in the year, a military convoy had caused a civilian crash in the nearby city that killed an entire family including several children. The local population was upset with the lack of timely compensation to the surviving family members. Many locals blamed the erratic driving of the ISAF forces and felt that the Training Center

was the root cause. There had been several close calls with vehicles from the base before the fatality accident. The ANP officer was related to the family that was killed in the accident. His command was aware of his connection to the family and was planning to transfer him to a new location. They did not share this information with the mentors and CF leadership working and living at the Training Center. Several other ANP members had noticed that the ANP officer was despondent about the accident.

Learning Point 1: *Cultural sensitivity and Threat Awareness: Perceived grievance caused by negligence can be direct contributing cause to actions taken by ANSF against CF. Quick compensation and apology to the surviving family members and working with the local elders to reach out could have helped ease the tensions. Sensitivity to the event and acknowledgment by CF leaders to address with Afghan counterparts could have assisted with mitigating the increased risk to CF personnel.*

Learning Point 2: *Atmospherics.* After the incident occurred, several individuals, both US and Afghan interpreters, said that they had noticed a change in the ANP Officer's demeanor and outlook in working with the mentors. You must be aware of changes in behavior and take time to determine if recent events with strategic impacts may have caused an increased risk to safety of personnel.

Learning Point 3: *Complacency.* You must always be aware of changes in the daily operating environment and never let your guard down, especially during times of population unrest due to a recent tragic event or ISAF-caused incident.

What ifs:

- What if the Training Command, ICW the Afghan leadership, had addressed this ANP officers's concerns about the accident?
- What if someone would have talked to the ANSF member about his demeanor?
- What if the mentors had been more observant of changes in behavior?

**Insider Threat Vignette # 9
Afghanistan Insider Threat**

Instructor Note: Learning Points should be drawn out via questions while discussing the incident vignettes in small group/unit training. Read the location and background information to the students before you start the vignette discussions. Do not read the incident summary to the students.

Vignette # 9 (ANA Shoots Soldier Taking Pictures on COP)

Incident Summary: On 02 Mar 12, ANA soldier shoots 1 U.S. Soldier while the U.S. Soldier was taking pictures of a recently renovated ANA Dining Facility on the Combat Outpost (COP). Shooter escaped from COP. Soldier WIA.

Location and Background: ANA DFAC located on COP Bull Run. ANA Soldier draws pistol and shoots the CF Member in leg while he is taking pictures of recently improved/renovated ANA DFAC. The soldier was taking photos as part of a good news story. The ANA Soldier had recently returned from leave.

Details: It is mid-way through Ramazan. The CF soldier arrived at the COP from FOB Lexington and greeted the ANA soldiers. He was with a trusted linguist interpreter who had accompanied him several times to this particular COP. The U.S. Soldier was not wearing body armor and had no designated security detail with him—only the linguist. The ANA soldier was mid-level NCO who had recently returned from leave with his family in southern Afghanistan. He was known to be a quiet individual. The ANA LT ordered the NCO to accompany the CF soldier to the recently renovated ANA DFAC once the interpreter explained they were there to take pictures for a good news story. While the soldier was taking pictures, the linguist lingered behind the ANA NCO and did not come forward to assist with any discussions. The ANA NCO watched as the CF soldier set down his equipment and took a drink of water before beginning to take pictures. With no warning, the ANA NCO drew his pistol and shot the CF soldier in the leg while he was taking photos. The ANA NCO then fled. Although, the exits from the COP were sealed, the ANA NCO was able to escape.

Learning Point 1: *Cultural sensitivity. Cultural awareness and knowledge of actions that may be offensive to your Afghan counterparts, especially during periods of religious importance such as Ramazan, will assist you in not causing an inadvertent grudge between you and the Afghans you are interacting with. You need to be very cognizant of your actions and the impacts on your host and refrain from insulting their practices by ignoring their cultural norms.*

Learning Point 2: Guardian Angel Employment: *Strict adherence to standing operating procedures to employ a Guardian Angel to provide protection and overwatch while engaging in meetings on ANSF compounds or areas where interaction with Afghans is required. Force protection measures and maintaining situational awareness at all times is critical.*

Learning Point 3: Complacency. *Force protection measures and requirements for Battle buddy were not followed. Complete trust in interpreter could have led to this situation developing into an opportunity for a disgruntled ANA soldier to gain favor by shooting a foreigner during Ramazan.*

What ifs:

- What if there had been a “guardian angel” and battle buddy accompanying the soldier while he performed his mission of obtaining photos?
- What if the soldier had not drank water while in view of the Afghan ANA members during their period of honoring Ramazan?
- What if the CF soldier would have noticed that his linguist was staying back and away from him while he prepared to take photos?

**Insider Threat Vignette # 10
Afghanistan Insider Threat Version 1.0**

Instructor Note: *Learning Points should be drawn out via questions while covering the incident vignettes. Read the location and background information to the students before you start the vignette discussions. Do not read the incident summary to the students.*

Vignette # 10 (KLE Engagement)

Incident Summary: On 13 AUG 12, while conducting Key Leader Engagement, elements from the National Directorate of Security and the 549th Military Police Company, received small arms fire from one AUP officer . The attack resulted in one U.S. Soldier WIA and one NDS officer WIA. The shooter escaped.

Location and Background: On 13 AUG 12, while conducting a Key leader engagement at the District center in Nangarhar, the members from an MP company, while working with their counterparts in the National Directorate of Security (NDS), and meeting with the local District Police Chief, were fired upon by one Afghan Uniform Police Officer. This ANP officer had recently expressed his dissatisfaction in not receiving pay. The unit was invited to visit the district police center but had only been there a few other times so was not as familiar with the layout of the compound.

Details: **The ANP officer had recently expressed his dissatisfaction in not receiving pay for the last two months. The unit members were invited to visit the district police center but had only been there one other time so they were not as familiar with the personnel at the center.**

Learning Point 1: *Gurardian Angel.* *In all circumstances, personnel must properly employ Guardian Angels to provide overwatch and protection for members engaging directly with local nationals. You need to constantly assess how current conditions impact the force protection level.*

Learning Point 2: *Atmospherics.* *The unit should have been aware of the status of pay and personnel problems at the local police district center so they could better gauge how their visit would be received. Any changes in behavior or any events or conditions that could lead to an unfavorable view of the CF should be considered in determining whether the visit should occur.*

Learning Point 3: *Complacency.* *No matter who you are dealing with, you cannot let your guard down when it comes to security at a shura. Just because you have a commonality (police unit dealing with police unit), you still must remain vigilant. All force protection measures must be used to mitigate risk to personnel in an unfamiliar setting.*

What ifs:

- What if the unit had not agreed to the shura in an unfamiliar location?
- What if the unit had been aware of the pay problems of some of the ANP members at this district center?
- What if someone would have talked to the ANSF member about his demeanor if he was showing signs of distress?

Insider Threat Vignette #11 Afghanistan Insider Threat

Instructor Note: Learning Points should be drawn out via questions while discussing the incident vignettes in small group/unit training. Read the location and background information to the students before you start the vignette discussions. Do not read the incident summary to the students.

Vignette #12 (The Insider Attack In Daily Living Areas)

Incident Summary: On 19 August 2012, an SFAT member was killed by an AUP member at the Spin Boldak District Police Center, while he entered the SFAT's living quarters.

Location and Background: A SFAT Team living area co-location near a District Police Center. Atmospherics at the center had recently changed when the AUP (Afghan Uniform Police) were instructed to use their logistics process in the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to obtain their fuel. This caused disparity in the quality of life for the AUP members there and the SFAT members who lived and worked with them at the District Center. The process to obtain fuel from the MOI Logistics is time-consuming and often will require a lot of detailed follow-up and mentoring at the Ministry level through the Provincial and District level to get the system to work properly and not be subject to corruption and shortages.

Details: After the end of an evening meeting, a U.S. Soldier was walking back to the SFAT's living quarters. Although he had noticed some grumbling at the meeting, he did not ask his interpreter if this was anything serious or something he could meet with the District Police chief about. Upon arrival at the SFAT living area, two disgruntled AUP members then ambushed him as he attempted to enter the SFAT billet area. The assailants were able to enter into the living area and continue their attack. Two other SFAT team members in the living area then killed by fire the lead assailant. The other attacker fled and escaped. Two more SFAT team members were isolated in another part of the living area and had no means of communication. The AUP at the camp had grown increasingly sullen and hostile prior to the attack and many of the AUP personnel had disappeared just prior to the assault. Those that were nearby did not offer any help to the SFAT team members during or after the attack and were uncooperative with the initial investigations into the incident.

The AUP lead assailant was a recent AUP Academy graduate but had not been biometrically enrolled. During the course of the investigation, it was determined that the AUP at the District Center were upset that the SFAT had stopped providing fuel and was requiring the AUP to now sue the MOI logistics channels to obtain what they needed, which was resulting in them not having fuel like the SFAT team members did.

Learning Point 1: *Atmospherics.* *The team members were not able to ascertain that there was a growing discontent among the AUP at the District Center, caused by the perceived inequities—“Haves and Have Nots”... The SFAT was unaware that they had inadvertently alienated their counterparts by encouraging them to rely on a slower system solely vice helping to “wean” them and get the MOI logistics system up and running to fully support the AUP needs prior to stopping assistance in obtaining fuel.*

Learning Point 2: *Force Protection Measures.* *No battle buddy team was employed and the follow on JCAT (Joint Casualty Assistance Team) investigation discovered that the SFAT team members were unaware of Tactical Directive/FRAGO concerning Guardian Angels use. Periodic and candid sensing sessions/shuras with their AUP counterparts may have been able to identify the source of potential friction points and may have been able to diffuse these issues prior to escalation to violence. Emergency communications, redundancy, and accountability plans plus active shooter drills to react to situation and adherence to published FRAGOs and Tactical Directives on Force Protection are critical. Never let your guard down.*

What if:

- What if the SFAT team members had recognized that the MOI logistics system is slow so there might be a gap in getting the needed supplies? What if they had addressed this with the District Police Chief?
- What if the Soldier had asked his interpreter why the Afghan AUP seemed sullen and angry the last few days and especially at the meeting?
- What if there was a guardian angel at the entrance to the SFAT living area?
- Had the SFAT team or unit leadership conducted an Insider Threat Vulnerability Assessment (ITVA) to identify possible areas where an attack could or would likely occur?
- What if there had been more command emphasis on the requirements of the Tactical Directive?
- What if the SFAT team members had practiced the Buddy Team and practiced drills for a potential Insider Attack?

**Insider Threat Vignette #12
Afghanistan Insider Threat**

Instructor Note: Learning Points should be drawn out via questions while discussing the incident vignettes in small group/unit training. Read the location and background information to the students before you start the vignette discussions. Do not read the incident summary to the students.

Vignette #12 (The Insider Attack during Morning Routine)

Incident Summary: In Jun 2009, several CF soldiers and sailors were killed when an Afghan guard opened fire at a base in RC-N when the CF were conducting physical training inside the base perimeter and gathering for entrance into the dining facility. 2 men and 2 women were killed in the attack while conducting a morning run.

Location and Background: A joint CF and Afghan ANA base in RC-N. At the height of the Ramazan fasting period, although cultural awareness training had been given to the CF stationed at the base prior to their arrival several months ago, with reminders for modesty and sensitivity to Afghan partners sharing the base, 4 CF members began conducting physical training and were running around the base perimeter inside the compound, in full view of the guard towers. They were not aware that the evening prior, an Afghan guard, while speaking to several local nationals who worked in the Dining facility on the base, overheard a male soldier cursing about the food and having to wait in line. The guard also noticed one of the civilian contract personnel, a woman, wearing a blouse that exposed her arms and was tight-fitting. He began to discuss the disrespect that the ISAF forces showed each day to the local workers and in the manner in which they dressed and spoke. Atmospherics around the base indicated generally a good working relationship between the local workers and the CF who lived on the base. However, the Afghan guard felt that his fellow countrymen had been disrespected and someone should have to pay.

Details: As soon as the CF began conducting their PT run, the Afghan guard opened fire. Meanwhile, another Afghan guard, who had been in the tower with the first guard, made his way to the entrance to the Dining facility. At the sound of his fellow guard opening fire, this Afghan guard also opened fire on troops standing in line outside the Dining Facility door as they waited to enter for the breakfast meal. 2 men and 2 women died in the attack, killed while conducting PT and 3 other CF were wounded. One ANA guard escaped and the other was killed by an Afghan guard manning the ECP who fired into the guard tower where the first shooter had positioned himself.

Learning Point 1: *Complacency.* *CF conducting physical training should be cognizant of where they conduct their training and what types of clothes they wear, especially if it can be viewed as offensive to the host culture. In a period of cultural significance, like Ramazan, CF should alter their daily routine and be especially aware of language, behavior and dress that can be offensive to Afghan partners or locals*

working on the base. Never let your guard down. Force protection measures and adherence and good discipline can ensure that a potential risk is not overlooked.

Learning Point 2: Atmospherics. *While overall atmospherics were generally good, the actions of a few individuals may have been what sparked the Afghan guards into violence against the CF partners on their shared base. Other indicators may demonstrate the intent of a particular individual, such as an individual's disgruntled demeanor or his offense at some action, and perhaps could have been lessened by respect for the cultural nuances during special religious holidays or events.*

What if:

- What if the offenses had been brought to the attention of CF leadership on the base by the Afghan Sergeant of the Guard?
- What if there had been a joint manning in the guard tower?
- What if there had been a guardian angel employed at the entrance to the Dining Facility?
- What if CF would have been reminded to be very aware of their language, dress and actions during Ramazan and also to alter their routines and conduct physical training only inside a guarded facility? Or to not gather or mass in large groups?

02 OCT 2012
IJC Religious Outreach

Information Paper: Best Practices with Religious and Cultural Advisors and District Officers of Haj and Religious Affairs in the Regional Commands

Executive Summary: The following survey resulted from a request from DCOS Comms to identify “best practices” in working with the ANA’s Religious and Cultural Advisors (RCAs) and the District Officers of Haj and Religious Affairs (DOHRAs) in order to enhance collaboration. It is also a useful tool for all involved in religious outreach and engagement to share lessons learned among our colleagues and to create a “community of praxis”, thereby gaining and sharing insights into how others operating in the field have learned to leverage the force of faith. As one can see from the following notes, each RC has chosen to approach the issue differently according to guidance from the commander, their unique circumstances and constraints and, of course, the relationship with the local leadership.

NB. The comments have not been highly edited in order to preserve the authenticity, candour and unique insights of each RC team.

a. RC S

1. RCAs

- Regular contact, as often as possible, ideally by personnel who are closely matched to all of the RCA's responsibilities - i.e. not just by Chaplains.
- Does not necessarily lead to observed improvement in operational ability, but does make the RCAs amenable to suggestions for tasks that they then 'own', e.g. RCAs organizing their own “Green on Blue” conference.

2. DoHRAs

- Hard to give a blanket answer for the whole of RC(S) due to the differences across the Provinces in the AO.
- Kandahar: The "Provincial Public Communicators Conference", held monthly at the Kandahar Media Information Centre is an excellent forum. Previously set up and run by ISAF, it is now 'owned' by the KMIC and brings together multiple GIRoA Governance strands, ANSF, the Governor's personal staff and RC(S) (IO, RP-S, PAO). We primarily are now in a 'listening' mode in a forum where all of these strands come together and discuss upcoming events (e.g. Ramadan) or reaction to events. We do have the opportunity to throw in suggestions or guide the conversation, but the forum is pretty much Afghan led now.

b. RC W

1. RCAs

- Basically our cooperation with RCAs is focused on the “Greene on Blue” prevention. Some initiatives like building an ANA Memorial museum to celebrate martyrs gained a lot of appreciation within ANA troops. In the end, we note that within the Religious Community, RC-W managed relations with all main Religious Leaders in the Province with the aim to gain influence with the larger Muslim Community.

2. DoHRAs

- DoHRA, and RC-W have set up a very fruitful relationship. The DoHRA he has been involved in the choice of the main Mosques within RC-W area where we deliver humanitarian assistance to meet their needs. RC-W close coordination with RCAs allows us to be informed about each event that could affect the whole environment. We also are taking the opportunity to pass messages that we ask the DoHras to bring up and use when talking to the people and the soldiers/policemen. Notwithstanding the recent events, sermons tend to neutral or positive.

c. RC SW

1. RCAS

- We believe that the ANA Religious Cultural Affairs (RCA) provide an ideal, long-term means for GIRoA's security forces to build bonds with local communities by conducting community outreach, specifically directed at mullahs and tribal elders.
- Our experience is that the RCAs will typically not act on something (any issue) unless there is an official directive (cipher/decreed) from the Ministry of Defense (MoD) that is promulgated to all Corps HQs directing that it be done.
- It is important to have a Senior RCA who is willing to direct his subordinate RCAs to act, specifically in terms of community outreach and support for the Afghan Peace & Reintegration Program (APRP).
- On the district-level, we have seen that some RCAs – on a case-by-case/district-by-district basis – can serve as excellent communicators/interlocutors with the local communities and with mullahs in particular. This appears to often be personality, and knowledge-base driven. In one particular case, a Tactical Psyops Team (TPT) regularly met with an RCA lieutenant (an RCA “mullah”), provided advice and mentoring to the RCA, and the RCA in turn regularly met with local mullahs in a particular District, in

Helmand Province to try to gain their trust and to increase cooperation between the community and the GIRoA security forces. This is the ideal situation in the districts.

2. DoHRA

- From our experience, the Provincial Line Director of the Ministry of Hajj & Religious Affairs (otherwise known as the Director of Hajj & Religious Affairs) is an ideal means to tap into the religious community within a province. In both Helmand and Nimroz Provinces, the DoHRAs have been the first connection to the much larger, non-governmental, civil society organization known as the Religious Scholars (Ulema) Council.
- Furthermore, working with both the DoHRA and the Ulema Council is one very solid step towards gaining the trust of the provincial government, as well as many other influential provincial and district GIRoA and civil society “actors” who observe that ISAF is genuinely respectful of this critically important part of the Afghan/Islamic society, and desires to hear their opinions as to how Afghan society should function.
- While the DoHRA and the Ulema Council may have a very limited reach in terms of their daily affairs within the provincial capital, the DoHRA sees hundreds of mullahs over a weekly period as they often come to the provincial *Hajj & Awqaf* (Pilgrimage and Religious Endowment) ministry to discuss religious affairs and weekly sermons, and to solicit information about the upcoming *Hajj* to Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the Ulema Council has much of the same amount of contact with fellow mullahs, and they likewise regularly travel to districts to participate in religious shuras or simply tribal/elders shuras.
- By gaining the trust of the at least a portion of the provincial Ulema, and the Provincial DoHRA, ISAF (military & civilian Combined Team) have the ability to diplomatically project their message to the religious scholars (Strategic Narrative, for instance), and through slowly and steadily cultivating a relationship of trust, ISAF may also be able to ask the religious scholars for their assistance in mitigating potential violence (following perceived insults or transgressions to Islam; following CIVCAS incidents; etc.). In Helmand, specifically, we have found that our best means to mitigate problems in this regard is to lay out the facts to the Provincial Governor, and to ask for the assistance of the PG and the ANSF leaders. The PG regularly communicates with the DoHRA and the Ulema Council, and has been quite successful in ensuring that the religious scholars promote peace & stability; moreover, it helps that ISAF regularly meets with, converses with, and supports to varying degrees the very same DoHRA and Ulema Council that the PG’s regularly engages.

- Relations should be one of trust, and diplomatic cooperation. We do not recommend trying to *employ* the DoHRA or the Ulema Council per se, or to *direct* them to take such-and-such action; rather, we maintain a collegial relationship with them, and regularly solicit their assistance. At the same time, we have provided them some direct assistance (e.g., *Mullahs as APRP Advocates* support mechanism), and a great deal of indirect assistance (mosque refurbishment; humanitarian supplies during religious holidays; training of ANSF to ensure a more stable environment, et al).
 - The following are some of the Best Practices that have been observed in the RC (SW) AO from the fall of 2009 to the present for developing successful Religious Engagement. They are by no means comprehensive, and it is generally acknowledged that “one size does not necessarily fit all
- 1. Cultivate strong relationships with the Afghan National Army’s (ANA) Religious and Cultural Affairs (RCA) Officers, and encourage them to serve as a bridge to the local Afghan communities, especially with the Afghan religious leaders.**

Several units have found that the ANA’s RCAs can serve as excellent bridges to the local Afghan communities, especially the Afghan religious leaders. RCA’s military duties combine that of a religious advisor (Chaplain, of sorts) and an Information Operations (IO) Officer. While all of the RCAs are not mullahs per se, they tend to share a strong understanding of Islam and their native Afghan culture. In fact, one ANA RCA Colonel led a local mullah shura in a Village, in Nawa District in March 2009; fluent in Pashto, Dari, and Arabic – he was also a *hafiz* (had memorized the Quran) – and forcefully and convincingly delivered his points on the importance of peace and education in Islam, while similarly counseling the gathering; “*mullahs are the key to security as they can communicate with the population.*” Other units, particularly Tactical Psyops Teams (TPT) have also found the utility of involving ANA RCAs in community projects and in addressing security concerns at shuras. ANA soldiers and ANP policemen not only respect the culture, traditions and religious customs of the people for whom they provide security, they frequently share a great deal of it.

- 2. Encourage, facilitate, and support regular local level (district and village) shuras for religious leaders (*mullahs, maulawis, sayyids, and pirs*¹).**

With the help of partnered ANA & AUP, and especially ANA RCAs, ISAF units should make an effort to reach out to the local religious leaders: (a) as a visible sign of respect for the Afghan culture, and the intention of ISAF to not change

¹ (U) *Mullah* (ملا) = (from Arabic) A learned man who typically administers a local village mosque, *Maulawi* (مولوی) = an advanced religious scholar, a title typically associated with those who have received religious training in India or Pakistan; generally indicative of the highest religious academia, *Sayyid* (سید) = (from Arabic) a descendant of the Prophet Mohammad, and *Pir* (پیر) = (from Pashto) Master of a Sufi order.

the dominant religion of Afghanistan, (b) to increase the religious leaders' sense of enfranchisement in community decisions, and (c) to foster a willingness on the part of the religious leaders to, in turn, "broadcast" positive (or at least, neutral) messages to the population – either orally at shuras or possibly on the Radio-in-a-Box (RIAB) system or Radio *Tamadoon*: Counter-Narcotics, Anti-Violence, Support for Stability in their communities, ANA/AUP recruiting, the Afghan Peace & Reintegration Program (APRP), et al. Of course, support for the local religious leaders may need to be discreet due to possible security threats; this is something that can best be determined with the assistance of partnered ANA. ISAF should likewise encourage the local AUP to take a keen interest in ensuring that local leaders, particularly positive influencers, are protected from harm at the hands of insurgents and other spoilers.

3. Highlight and encourage the participation of unit Chaplains – as mission and service restrictions allow – in Religious Engagement Activities.

One of the principal benefits of having ISAF Chaplains participate in events with ANA RCAs, local Afghan religious leaders, and simply local Afghan citizens, is that their very presence highlights the fact that ISAF's military forces (and civilian advisors) are generally not secular or atheistic in nature (in contrast to the former Soviet Union's military), but rather embrace freedom of religion – and their commanders value their spiritual advisors. While only a minority of chaplains and troops are Muslims, the vast majority are still considered *Ahl Al-Kitab*².

4. Support local religious leaders and their communities during Islamic religious holidays; e.g., *Ramazan, Eid Al-Fitr, Hajj, Eid Al-Adha, and Mawlood An-Nabi* (Birth of the Prophet), at a minimum.

One of the principal requests that religious leaders have repeatedly made of ISAF is to respect Islam and the cultural mores of Afghans, and to assist the local population with foodstuffs (rice, flour, cooking oil, dates, et al.) during Islamic holidays, with a special emphasis on the 30-days of Ramazan and the culminating 3-day celebration of *Eid Al-Fitr* (Festival of Breaking [the Fast]). Commanders are highly encouraged to organize *iftar* events (nightly breaking of the fast during the first 29 nights of Ramazan) and other shuras – with the assistance of ANA RCAs – to embrace the local communities in the areas with which they are responsible for security. The support provided during Operations *Ramazan Mubarak* in 2010, 2011 and 2012, for instance, was very well received throughout Helmand and Nimroz Provinces.

5. Employ the use of Relationship-Building Items (RBI) and other reconstruction/development projects to cultivate positive relations with local religious leaders.

² (U) *Ahl Al-Kitab* = (from Arabic) People of the Book (أهل الكتاب) is a reference to Christians and Jews who read and follow some of the divine books such as the Old Testament (*Torah*) and the New Testament (*Anjeel*); generally regarded with respect in the Quran.

In addition to providing a secure forum for mullah shuras, and lunch for the attendees, it is also a good idea to allow for a modest amount of gifts or Relationship-Building Items to be presented to the local mullahs and/or other guests at the conclusion of a shura – preferably by the partnered ANA, or AUP – but at times by ISAF as well. These items can include things like turbans, individual prayer rugs, prayer beads, and even Qurans (while technically not prohibited from handling the Islamic holy book, the better rule of thumb is to avoid doing so in order to avoid any potential sensitivity among the more conservative population). These shuras may likewise be an opportune time to discuss some reconstruction/refurbishment/development projects, particularly those of some significance to the religious leaders.

- 6. As commanders deem appropriate, leverage the relationship between the RC and provincial-level religious leaders, to include the Helmand & Nimroz Directors of *Hajj & Awqaf* & the Heads of the Helmand & Nimroz Ulema Council, to lend support to local mullahs within their Battlespace.**

The RC has fostered a strong relationship with both the senior provincial GIROA official representing the Ministry of Hajj & Religious Affairs, and the non-governmental Chairmen of the Helmand & Nimroz Ulema Councils. If desired by the commander or associated District Stabilization Team (DST), RC (SW) is always ready to facilitate and to support a visit by these officials, and other influential provincial religious leaders in order to meet with local mullahs on the district and village level and to foster their relations with the provincial government.

- 7. As commanders deem appropriate, utilize visits by U.K. and U.S. Muslim religious leaders; and trips to the U.S., U.K., UAE, and Jordan (e.g., Voices of Religious Tolerance (VORT)).**

While still largely an untapped resource, and potentially fertile ground for more development, in the few instances where these visits have been observed, there has been a generally positive reception at provincial ulema assemblies and local district shuras – when either an Afghan religious leader has returned from a trip to the United States, the United Kingdom, or some other largely stable Islamic state and provided positive feedback about the respect for Islam in these places and the ability of Muslims to practice their faith freely. Visiting Muslim clerics from both the U.K. and U.S. have likewise received warm welcomes from the local religious leaders in Lashkar Gah and in some districts of Helmand and Nimroz Provinces.

- 8. Mitigate potential crises by leveraging relationship with religious leaders.**

Finally, cultivating positive relationships with local Afghan religious leaders – either with the help of partnered ANA/AUP or done independently – may be one means to mitigate crises, particularly those that deal with a transgression or perceived transgression of Islamic mores. Demonstrations and/or riots over

alleged Quran burnings have occurred in some districts. Building, and then leveraging, friendly relations with local religious leaders, though, have a tendency to diminish the amount of potential ill-will towards ISAF military and civilians. In many cases, units will patrol with ANA/AUP to serve as a “buffer” with the local communities, while particularly making use of the ANA RCAs. Furthermore, units have found that having a local mullah witness a required search of a compound, the discovery of IEDs or narcotics in religious buildings, an allegation of Quran desecration, or the detention of an Afghan, is likewise a means to ensure that Afghan culture is respected and that insurgents have much less of an ability to fabricate lies and perceived slights if local religious leaders have been consulted and/or involved in ISAF actions. Along those same lines, a mullah’s moral authority in the community is such that his witness statement at the scene of an ANSF and ISAF compound raid is one of the best pieces of evidence possible for prosecuting insurgent detainees in Afghan state courts³.

d. RC E

1. RC E does not work directly with the RCAs or DoHRAs but instead are utilizing the Jordanian Engagement Team (JET) to perform religious engagements in RC-E. The JET promotes the Amman Message articulated by King Abdullah in November 2004 which defines what Islam is and what it is not in response to concerns about increasingly extreme views of the religion. It was adopted by the Organization of Islamic Conference in December 2005 and signed by more than 500 Islamic leaders and scholars around the world by June 2006. King Abdullah offered to deploy members of the Jordanian Armed Forces to Afghanistan in 2011 to share this message; the RC E team arrived in November 2011.

2. Team Composition: The Team is composed of 11 Jordanian officers, including two imams, three females, a doctor and a nurse. They work alone and with the RCAs and DoHRAs. In working with them, they find the following are major topics and questions frequently asked by Afghans:

- Is Service in the ANSF is honorable and consistent with Islam? (Absolutely)
- Is it ever right to kill a fellow Muslim or those sent to help you? (the JET points out that western nations helped Jordan become what it is today)
- The Prophet expects Muslims to express opinions peacefully, not through violence

3. Additional support provided:

- Recorded radio messages addressing emerging topics (announcement of punishment for Koran burning and urination video; “Innocence of Muslims” video; Pastor Terry Jones statements and actions)

³ (U) Interview with GIRoA official.


- Advised the Command on ways to address the cultural divide between the Coalition and Afghans as well as messages to use to inform Afghan soldiers about the honor of their service.
4. Key observations by the Jordanians:
- Afghan soldiers are trying to reconcile their service with their faith; questions along these lines are the most common
 - Afghans are disappointed that other Muslim nations are absent from Afghanistan; the International Community should enable a National Islamic Conference in Afghanistan
 - The ANSF should increase community outreach (school visits, rebuilding mosques, etc.) to help the people learn about their soldiers, specifically to see them as Muslim

e. RC N

1. RCAs

- RC North's best practices and lessons learned come from their partnering with the RCA XXX ANA Corps.
- The RCA is a key enabler IOT enhance the better cooperation between the different ANSF.
- The RCA in the 209th Corps is- as seen from our experience to be t the head of the Info Ops Tashkil. Thus, he is also able to enhance the relationship between the ANA and the society (RCA XXX Corps conducted IFTAR- Dinners during Ramadan with local Mullahs and village elders)
- It is helpful to have a Muslim ISAF soldier IOT to intensify the relationship with the RCA.
- See diagram below showing our thoughts on how a common messaging could be reached via the RCA.

Religious Network



Prepared by LTC Gianni Martin, CIG/Religious Outreach
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